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Abstract
We discuss a simplified version of the testing problem considered by Pelican & Graham
(2019): testing for interdependencies in preferences over links among N (possibly hetero-
geneous) agents in a network. We describe an exact test which conditions on a sufficient
statistic for the nuisance parameter characterizing any agent-level heterogeneity. Employing
an algorithm due to Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011), we show how to simulate the null distri-
bution of the test statistic in order to estimate critical values and/or p-values. We illustrate
our methods using the Nyakatoke risk-sharing network. We find that the transitivity of
the Nyakatoke network far exceeds what can be explained by degree heterogeneity across
households alone.
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De Weerdt (2004) studies the formation of risk-sharing links among N = 119 households
located in the Tanzanian village of Nyakatoke. Let Pˆ ( ) and Pˆ ( ), respectively, equal
the fraction of all
(
N
3
)
triads which take the triangle and two-star configuration. De Weerdt
(2004) finds that the transitivity of the Nyakatoke risk-sharing network
TˆI =
3Pˆ ( )
3Pˆ ( ) + Pˆ ( )
= 0.1884 (1)
is almost three times its density (Pˆ ( ) = 0.0698). There are several, not necessarily
mutually exclusive, explanations for the clustering present in Nyakatoke. First, it may reflect
the increased value of a risk-sharing relationship between two households when “supported”
by a third household (Jackson et al., 2012). Households i and j may value a risk sharing link
with each other more if they are both additionally linked to household k. Household k may
then serve as a monitor, arbiter and referee for households i and j’s relationship (increasing
its value). Second, clustering may simply be an artifact of degree heterogeneity, whereby
high degree households link more frequently with one-another and hence form triangles ( )
incidentally. Third, clustering may also stem from homophilous sorting on kinship, ethnicity,
religion and so on (McPherson et al., 2001).
In this chapter we outline a method of randomization inference, in the spirit of Fisher
(1935), that can be used to “test” for externalities, or interdependencies, in link formation.2
Externalities arise when the utility two agents generate when forming a link varies with
the presence or absence of edges elsewhere in the network. Attaching greater utility to
“supported” links is one such interdependency. Externalities typically imply that an efficient
network will not form when link formation is negotiated bilaterally (e.g., Bloch & Jackson,
2007). Consider household i, who is linked to k, an incidental consequence of i additionally
linking to j, is that she will then be able to “support” any link between j and k. When
evaluating whether to form a link with j, i may not internalize this additional, non-bilateral,
benefit; consequently, there may be too few risk-sharing links in Nyakatoke.
The scientific and policy implications of externalities are considerable (cf., Graham, 2016).
In the presence of interdependencies small re-wirings of a network may induce a cascade of
link revisions, alternating network structure, as well as agents’ utility, substantially. In the
absence of interdependencies links form bilaterally and re-wirings will not induce additional
changes in network structure.
Testing for externalities in network formation is not straightforward; particularly if the null
2We place “test” in quotes to emphasize that while, as in other examples of randomization inference, the
null hypothesis is explicitly formulated, rejection may arise for a variety of reasons. See Cox (2006, Chapter
3) for additional examples and discussion.
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Figure 1: Nyakatoke risk-sharing network
Wealth < 150,000 TSh
150,000 TSh ≤ Wealth < 300,000 TSh
300,000 TSh ≤ Wealth < 600,000 TSh
Wealth ≥ 600,000 TSh
Notes: Nodes/Households are colored according to total land and livestock wealth in Tanzanian
Shillings (calculated as described by Comola & Fafchamps (2014)). Node sizes are proportional to
degree.
Source: De Weerdt (2004) and authors’ calculations. Raw data available at
https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/joachim-deweerdt/ (Accessed January 2017).
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model allows for rich forms of agent-level heterogeneity. Allowing for heterogeneity under
the null is essential, after all, such heterogeneity provides an alternative explanation for the
type of link clustering which arises in the presence of externalities.
The approach outlined here draws upon Pelican & Graham (2019). Our goal here, how-
ever, is primarily pedagogical; to introduce some key ideas and methods likely to be of
interest to empirical researchers interested in networks. Relative to what is presented here,
Pelican & Graham (2019) additionally consider (i) directed as well as undirected networks,
(ii) null models which allow for both degree heterogeneity and homophily, (iii) models with
and without transfers, (iv) constructing test statistics to maximize power in certain direc-
tions and (v) novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods of simulating the null
distribution of the test statistic.
While the presentation in this chapter is more basic, the upshot is that the method outlined
here can be implemented by combining familiar heuristics (e.g., Milo et al., 2002) with a
little game theory and the adjacency matrix simulation algorithm of Blitzstein & Diaconis
(2011).
We begin by outlining a simple network formation game with transfers in the spirit of
Bloch & Jackson (2007). We then formally describe our test. Next we discuss how to simu-
late the null distribution of our test statistic using an algorithm due to Blitzstein & Diaconis
(2011); we also briefly discuss other applications of this algorithm as well as alternatives to
it. We close with an illustration based upon the Nyakatoke network.
In what follows we let D be the adjacency matrix associated with a simple graph G (V, E)
defined on N = |V| vertices or agents. The set V = {1, . . . , N} includes all agents in the
network and E ⊆ V × V equals the set of undirected edges or links among them. The set of
all N ×N undirected adjacency matrices is denoted by DN .
A strategic network formation game with transfers
In this section we outline a simple model of strategic network formation where agents may
make (bilateral) transfers to one another. Let νi : DN → R be a utility function for agent
i, which maps adjacency matrices – equivalently networks – into utils. The marginal utility
for agent i associated with (possible) edge (i, j) is
MUij (D) =
{
νi (D)− νi (D− ij) ifDij = 1
νi (D+ ij)− νi (D) ifDij = 0
(2)
4 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
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where D − ij is the adjacency matrix associated with the network obtained after deleting
edge (i, j) and D+ ij the one obtained via link addition.
From Bloch & Jackson (2006), a network is pairwise stable with transfers if the following
condition holds.
Definition 1. (Pairwise stability with Transfers) The network G (V, E) is pairwise
stable with transfers if
(i) ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (G) , MUij (D) +MUji (D) ≥ 0
(ii) ∀ (i, j) /∈ E (G) , MUij (D) +MUji (D) < 0
Definition 1 states that the marginal utility of all links actually present in a pairwise stable
network is (weakly) positive, while that associated with links not present is negative. The
definition presumes utility is transferable, since it only requires that the sum of utility to i
and j associated with edge (i, j) is positive. When the sum of the two marginal utilities is
positive, there exists a within-dyad transfer such that both agents benefit. Note also that
the definition is pairwise: the benefit of a link is evaluated conditional on the remaining
network structure. It is possible, for example, that a coalition of players could increase their
utility by jointly forming a set of links and making transfers to one another. Imposing more
sophisticated play of this type would result in a refinement relative to the set of network
configurations which satisfy Definition 1 (cf., Jackson, 2008).
In this chapter we will specialize to utility functions of the form
νi (d,U; γ0, δ0) =
∑
j
dij [Ai +Bj + γ0sij (d)− Uij] (3)
with U = [Uij ]. Here Ai and Bj capture agent-level degree heterogeneity (cf., Graham,
2017). If Ai is high, then the baseline utility associated with any link is high for agent i (i is
an “extrovert”). If Bj is high, then j is a particularly attractive partner for all other agents
(j is “popular”). We leave the joint distribution of A = [Ai] and B = [Bi] unrestricted in
what follows.
The sij (d) term is associated with externalities in link formation. We require that sij (d) =
sij (d− ij) = sij (d+ ij); additional restrictions might be needed to ensure the existence of
a network that is pairwise stable with transfers and/or a test statistic with a non-degenerate
null distribution.
Instead of formulating additional high-level conditions on sij (d), in what follows we empha-
5 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
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size, and develop results for, two specific examples. In the first sij (d) equals
sij (d) =
∑
k
djk, (4)
which implies that agents receive more utility from links with popular (or high degree) agents.
The second example specifies sij (d) as
sij (d) =
∑
k
dikdjk, (5)
which implies that dyads receive more utility from linking when they share other links in
common. This is a transitivity effect.
When the utility function is of the form given in (3) the marginal utility agent i gets from
a link with j is
MUij (d,U; γ0, δ0) = Ai +Bj + γ0sij (d)− Uij .
Pairwise stability then implies that, conditional on the realizations of A, B, U and the value
of externality parameter γ0, the observed network must satisfy, for i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and
j = i+ 1, . . . , N
Dij = 1
(
A˜i + A˜j + γ0s˜ij (d) ≥ U˜ij
)
(6)
with A˜i = Ai +Bi, s˜ij (d) = sij (d) + sji (d) and U˜ij = Uij + Uji.
Equation (6) defines a system of
(
N
2
)
= 1
2
N (N − 1) nonlinear simultaneous equations. Any
solution to this system – and there will typically be multiple ones – constitutes a pairwise
stable (with transfers) network. To make this observation a bit more explicit, similar to
Miyauchi (2016), consider the mapping ϕ (D) : DN → I(N
2
):
ϕ (d) ≡


1
(
A˜1 + A˜2 + γ0s˜12 (d) ≥ U12
)
1
(
A˜1 + A˜3 + γ0s˜13 (d) ≥ U13
)
...
1
(
A˜N−1 + A˜N + γ0s˜N−1N (d) ≥ UN−1N
)


. (7)
Under the maintained assumption that the observed network satisfies Definition 1, the ob-
served adjacency matrix corresponds to the fixed point
D = vech−1 [ϕ (D)] .
6 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
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Here vech(·) vectorizes the
(
N
2
)
elements in the lower triangle of an N × N matrix and we
define its inverse operator as creating a symmetric matrix with a zero diagonal. In addition
to the observed network there may be other d ∈ DN such that d = vech
−1 [ϕ (d)]. The fixed
point representation is useful for showing equilibrium existence as well as for characterization
(e.g., using Tarski’s (1955) fixed point theorem).
For the two types of network formation externalities we consider, specified in equations (4)
and (5) above, the ϕ (d) mapping is weakly increasing in d for γ0 ≥ 0. This allows for
the application of Tarski’s (1955) theorem; ensuring existence of at least one pairwise stable
equilibrium.
Test formulation
Our goal is to assess the null hypothesis that γ0 = 0 relative to the alternative that γ0 > 0.
The extension of what follows to two-sided tests is straightforward. A feature our testing
problem is the presence of a high-dimensional nuisance parameter in the form of the N degree
heterogeneity terms, A˜ =
[
A˜i
]
. Since the value of these terms may range freely over the
null, our null hypothesis is a composite one.
The composite nature of the null hypothesis raises concerns about size control. Ideally
our test will have good size properties regardless of the particular value of A˜. Assume,
for example, that the distribution of the
{
A˜i
}N
i=1
is right-skewed. In this case we will
likely observe high levels of clustering among high A˜i agents. Measured transitivity in the
network might be substantial even in the absence of any structural preference for transitive
relationships. We want to avoid excessive rejection of our null hypothesis in such settings;
we do so by varying the critical value used for rejection with the magnitude of a sufficient
statistics for the
{
A˜i
}N
i=1
.
A simple example helps to fix ideas. Under the null we have, for i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and
j = i+ 1, . . . , N ,
Pr (Dij = 1) =
exp
(
A˜i + A˜j
)
1 + exp
(
A˜i + A˜j
) , (8)
which corresponds to the β-model of network formation (e.g., Chatterjee et al., 2011). As-
sume that A˜i ∈
{
−∞, 1
2
ln
(
ρ
1−ρ
)}
with A˜i = −∞ with probability 1 − pi. In this simple
model two “high” A˜i agents link with probability ρ, while low-to-low and low-to-high links
never form. Some simple calculations give an overall density for this network of pi2ρ, and a
(population) transitivity index of ρ. For pi small and or ρ large, transitivity in this network
7 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
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may exceed density substantially even though there is no structural taste for transitive links
among agents. Here the transitivity is entirely generated by high degree agents linking with
one another with greater frequency and, only incidentally, forming triangles in the process.
A simple comparison of density and transitivity in this case is uninformative.
Motivated in part by this inferential challenge, as well as to exploit classic results on testing
in exponential families (e.g., Lehmann & Romano, 2005, Chapter 4), it will be convenient
in what follows to assume that U˜ij ∼ Logistic (0, 1). Next let A denoting a subset of the N
dimensional Euclidean space in which A˜ is, a priori, known to lie, and
Θ0 =
{(
γ, A˜′
)
: γ = 0, A˜ ∈ A
}
.
Our null hypothesis is
H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 (9)
since A˜ may range freely over A ⊂ RN under the null of no externalities in link formation
(γ0 = 0).3 With a little manipulation we can show that, under (9), the probability of the
event D = d takes the exponential family form
P0
(
d; A˜
)
= c
(
A˜
)
exp
(
d
′
+A˜
)
with d+ = (d1+, . . . , dN+) equal to the degree sequence of the network.
Let DN,d+ denote the set of all undirected N×N adjacency matrices with degree counts also
equal to d+ and
∣∣DN,d+∣∣ denote the size, or cardinality, of this set. Under H0 the conditional
likelihood of D = d given D+ = d+ is
P0 (d|D+ = d+) =
1∣∣DN,d+∣∣ .
Under the null of no externalities all networks with identical degree sequences are equally
probable. This insight will form the basis of our test.
Let T (d) be some statistic of the adjacency matrix D = d, say its transitivity index. We
work with a (test) critical function of the form
φ (d) =


1 T (d) > cα (d+)
gα (d+) T (d) = cα (d+)
0 T (d) < cα (d+)
.
3There is an additional (implicit) nuisance parameter associated with equilibrium selection since, under
the alternative, there may be many pairwise stable network configurations. We can ignore this complication
for our present purposes, but see Pelican & Graham (2019) for additional discussion and details.
8 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
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We will reject the null if our statistic exceeds some critical value, cα (d+) and accept it – or
fail to reject it – if our statistic falls below this critical value. If our statistic exactly equals
the critical value, then we reject with probability gα (d+). The critical value cα (d+), as well
as the probability gα (d+), are chosen to set the rejection probability of our test under the
null equal to α (i.e., to control size). In order to find the appropriate values of cα (d+) and
gα (d+) we need to know the distribution of T (D) under the null.
Conceptually this distribution is straightforward to characterize; particularly if we proceed
conditional on the degree sequence observed in the network in hand. Under the null all pos-
sible adjacency matrices with degree sequence d+ are equally probable. The null distribution
of T (D) therefore equals its distribution across all these matrices. By enumerating all the
elements of DN,d+ and calculating T (d) for each one, we could directly – and exactly – com-
pute this distribution. In practice this is not (generally) computationally feasible. Even for
networks that include as few as 10 agents, the set DN,d+ may have millions of elements (see,
for example, Table 1 of Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011)). Below we show how to approximate
the null distribution of T (D) by simulation, leading to a practical method of finding critical
values for testing.
If we could efficiently enumerate the elements of DN,d+ we would find cα (d+) by solving
Pr
(
T (D) ≥ cα (d+)|D ∈ DN,d+
)
=
∑
D∈DN,d+
1 (T (D) ≥ cα (d+))∣∣DN,d+∣∣ = α. (10)
If there is no cα (d+) for which (10) exactly holds, then we would instead find the smallest
cα (d+) such that Pr
(
T (D) > cα (d+)|D ∈ DN,d+
)
≥ α and choose gα (d+) to ensure correct
size.
Alternatively we might instead calculate the p-value:
Pr
(
T (D) ≥ T (d+)|D ∈ DN,d+
)
=
∑
D∈DN,d+
1 (T (D) ≥ T (d+))∣∣DN,d+∣∣ . (11)
If this probability is very low, say less than 5 percent of all networks in DN,d+ have a
transitivity index larger than the one observed in the network in hand, then we might
conclude that our network is “unusual” and, more precisely, that it is not a uniform random
draw from DN,d+ (our null hypothesis).
Below we show how to approximate the probabilities to the left of the equalities in (10) and
(11) by simulation.
9 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
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Similarity of the test
In our setting, a test φ (D), will have size α if its null rejection probability (NRP) is less
than or equal to α for all values of the nuisance parameter:
sup
θ∈Θ0
Eθ [φ (D)] = sup
A˜∈A
Eθ [φ (D)] = α.
Since A˜ is high dimensional, size control is non-trivial. This motivates, as we have done,
proceeding conditionally on the degree sequence.
Let D+ be the set of all graphical degree sequences (see below for a discussion of “graphic”
integer sequences). For each d+ ∈ D+ our approach is equivalent to forming a test with the
property that, for all θ ∈ Θ0,
Eθ [φ (D)|D+ = d+] = α. (12)
Such an approach ensures similarity of our test since, by iterated expectations
Eθ [φ (D)] = Eθ [Eθ [φ (D)|D+]] = α
for any θ ∈ Θ0 (cf., Ferguson, 1967). By proceeding conditionally we ensure the NRP is
unaffected by the value of the degree heterogeneity distribution
{
A˜i
}N
i=1
. Similar tests have
proved to be attractive in other settings with composite null hypotheses (cf., Moreira, 2009).
Choosing the test statistic
Ideally the critical function is chosen to maximize the probability of correctly rejecting
the null under particular alternatives of interest. It turns out that, because our network
formation model is incomplete under the alternative (as we have been silent about equilibrium
selection), constructing tests with good power is non-trivial. In Pelican & Graham (2019)
we show how to choose the critical function, or equivalently the statistic T (d), to maximize
power against particular (local) alternatives. The argument is involved, so here we confine
ourselves to a more informal development.
An common approach to choosing a test statistic, familiar from other applications of ran-
domization testing (e.g., Cox, 2006, Chapter 3), is to proceed heuristically. This suggests, for
example, choosing T (D) to be the transitivity index, or the support measure of Jackson et al.
(2012), if the researcher is interested in “testing” for whether agents prefer transitive rela-
tionships.
10 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
UC - Berkeley and St. Gallen Bryan S. Graham and Andrin Pelican
A variation on this approach, inspired by the more formal development in Pelican & Graham
(2019), is to set T (D) equal to
T (D) =
∑
i<j
(Dij − pˆij) s˜ij (d) (13)
with pˆij =
exp
(
ˆ˜
Ai+
ˆ˜
Aj
)
1+exp
(
ˆ˜
Ai+
ˆ˜
Aj
) and ˆ˜A =
[
ˆ˜Ai
]
the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of A˜.4
The intuition behind (13) is as follows: if it is positive, this implies that high values of the
externality term, s˜ij (d), are associated with links that have low estimated probability under
the null (such that Dij− pˆij is large). The conjunction of “surprising” links with large values
of s˜ij (d) is taken as evidence that γ0 > 0.
Consider the transitivity example with s˜ij (d) = 2
∑
k dikdjk; statistic (13), with some ma-
nipulation, can be shown to equal
T (D) = 6
[∑
i<j<k
DijDikDjk −
∑
i<j<k
1
3
(pˆijDikDjk +Dij pˆikDjk +DijDikpˆjk)
]
. (14)
Statistic (14) is a measure of the difference between the actual number of triangles in the
network and (a particular) expected triangle count computed under the null. To see this
assume, as would be approximately true if the graph were an Erdös-Rényi one, that pˆij =
Pˆ ( ) for all i < j. Recalling that Pˆ ( ) and Pˆ ( ) respectively equal the fraction of all(
N
3
)
triads which are triangles and two-stars, we would have
T (D) = 2
(
N
3
) [
3Pˆ ( )−
(
3Pˆ ( ) + Pˆ ( )
)
Pˆ ( )
]
.
The term in [] equals the difference between the numerator of the transitivity index and
its denominator times density. For an Erdös-Rényi graph this difference should be approx-
imately zero. In the presence of degree heterogeneity, the second term to the right of the
equality in (14) is a null-model-assisted count of the expected number of triangles in G. A
rejection therefore occurs when many “surprising” triangles are present.
Before describing how to simulate the null distribution of T (D) we briefly recap. We start
by specifying a sharp null hypothesis. Consider the network in hand with adjacency matrix
D = d and corresponding degree sequence D+ = d+. Our null hypothesis is that the
observed network coincides with a uniform random draw from DN,d+ (i.e., the set of all
networks with identical degree sequences). This null is a consequence of the form on the
4Chatterjee et al. (2011) present a simple fixed point algorithm for computing this MLE (see also Graham
(2017)).
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transferable utility network formation game outlined earlier. The testing procedure is to
compare a particular statistic of D = d, say T (d), with its distribution across DN,d+. If the
observed value of T (d) is unusually large we take this as evidence against our null.
Although we have motivated our test as one for strategic interactions or externalities, in
actuality we are really assessing the adequacy of a particular null model of network formation
– namely the β-model. Our test may detect many types of violations of this model, albeit
with varying degrees of power. Consequently we need to be careful about how we interpret
a rejection in practice. At the same time, by choosing the test statistic T (D) with some
care, we hope to generate good power to detect the violation of interest – that γ0 > 0 – and
hence conclude that externalities in link formation are likely present when we reject.
Simulating undirected networks with fixed degree
This section describes an algorithm, introduced by Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011), for
sampling uniformly from the set DN,d+ . Our notation and exposition tracks that of
Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011), albeit with less details. As noted previously, direct enumera-
tion of all the elements of DN,d+ is generally not feasible. We therefore require a method of
sampling from DN,d+ uniformly and also, at least implicitly, estimating its size. The goal is
to replace, for example, the exact p-value (11) with the simulation estimate
Pˆr
(
T (D) ≥ T (d)|D ∈ DN,d+
)
=
1
B
B∑
b=1
1 (T (Db) ≥ T (d)) , (15)
where Db is a uniform random draw from DN,d+ and B denotes the number of independent
simulation draws selected by the researcher.
Two complications arise. First, it is not straightforward to construct a random draw from
DN,d+ . Second, we must draw uniformly from this set. Fortunately the first challenge is
solvable using ideas from the discrete math literature. Researchers in graph theory and
discrete math have studied the construction of graphs with fixed degrees and, in particular,
provided conditions for checking whether a particular degree sequence is graphical (e.g.,
Sierksma & Hoogeveen, 1991). We say that d+ is graphical if there is feasible undirected
network with degree sequence d+. Not all integer sequences are graphical. The reader can
verify, for example, that there is no feasible undirected network of three agents with degree
sequence d+ = (3, 2, 1).
As for the second complication, although we can not easily/directly construct a uniform
random draw from DN,d+ , we can use importance sampling (e.g., Owen, 2013) to estimate
12 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
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expectations with respect to this distribution.
The basic idea and implementation is due to Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011). A similar, and
evidently independently derived, algorithm is presented in Del Genio et al. (2010). While
computationally faster approaches are now available, we nevertheless present the method
introduced by Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011) for it pedagogical value and easy implementa-
tion. Their approach is adequate for small to medium sized problems. Readers interested
in applying the methods outlined below to large sparse graphs might consult Rao et al.
(1996), McDonald et al. (2007) or Zhang & Chen (2013). Pelican & Graham (2019) intro-
duce a more complicated MCMC simulation algorithm that holds additional graph statistics
constant (besides the degree sequence). They also provide references to the fairly extensive
literature on adjacency matrix simulation.
While our presentation of the Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011) algorithm is motivated by a
particular formal testing problem, our view is that it is also useful for more informally finding
“unusual” or “interesting” features of a given network. Are links more transitive than one
would expect in networks with similar degree sequences? Is average path length exceptionally
short? For this reason, the material presented below may also enter a researcher’s workflow
during the data summarization or exploratory analysis stage.
The algorithm
A sequential network construction algorithm begins with a matrix of zeros and sequentially
adds links to it until its rows and columns sum to the desired degree sequence. Unfortunately,
unless the links are added appropriately, it is easy to get “stuck” (in the sense that at a certain
point in the process it becomes impossible to reach a graph with the desired degree and the
researcher must restart the process). The paper by Snijders (1991) provides examples and
discussion of this phenomena.
As an example consider the graphical degree sequence d+ = (2, 2, 1, 1). If we begin with an
empty graph and add an edge between agents 3 and 4, we will go from the degree sequence
(2, 2, 1, 1) to a residual one of (2, 2, 0, 0). Unfortunately (2, 2, 0, 0) is not graphical. Adding
more edges requires introducing self-loops or a double-edge, neither of which is allowed.
Intuitively we can avoid this phenomenon by first connecting high degree agents. Havel
(1955) and Hakimi (1962) showed that this idea works for any degree sequence
Theorem 1. (Havel-Hakimi) Let di+ > 0, if d+ does not have at least di+ positive entries
other than i it is not graphical. Assume this condition holds. Let d˜+ be a degree sequence of
length N − 1 obtained by
13 © B. Graham and A. Pelican, 2019
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[i] deleting the ith entry of d+ and
[ii] subtracting 1 from each of the di+ highest elements in d+ (aside from the ith one).
d+ is graphical if and only if d˜+ is graphical. If d+ is graphical, then it has a realization
where agent i is connected to any of the di+ highest degree agents (other than i).
Theorem 1 gives a verifiable condition for whether a degree sequence is graphical.
Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011) extended this condition so that we can check whether a degree
sequence is graphical if one node is already connected to some other nodes. This modified
condition serves as a tool in their importance sampling algorithm.
Theorem 1 is suggestive of a sequential approach to building an undirected network with
degree sequence d+. The procedure begins with a target degree sequence d+. It starts by
choosing a link partner for the lowest degree agent (with at least one link). It chooses a
partner for this agent from among those with higher degree. A one is then subtracted from
the lowest degree agent and her chosen partner’s degrees. This procedure continues until the
residual degree sequence (the sequence of links that remain to be chosen for each agent) is a
vector of zeros.
To formally describe such an approach we require some additional notation. Let (⊕i1,...,ikd+)
be the vector obtained by adding a one to the i1, . . . , ik elements of d+:
(⊕i1,...,ikd+)j =
{
dj+ + 1 for j ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}
dj+ otherwise
Let (⊖i1,...,ikd+) be the vector obtained by subtracting one from the i1, . . . , ik elements of
d+:
(⊖i1,...,ikd+)j =
{
dj+ − 1 for j ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}
dj+ otherwise
Algorithm 1. (Blitzstein and Diaconis)A sequential algorithm for constructing a ran-
dom graph with degree sequence d+ = (d1+, . . . , dN+)
′ is
1. Let D be an empty adjacency matrix.
2. If d+ = 0 terminate with output D
3. Choose the agent i with minimal positive degree di+.
4. Construct a list of candidate partners J = {j 6= i : Dij = Dji = 0 and ⊖i,j d+ graphical}.
5. Pick a partner j ∈ J with probability proportional to its degree in d+.
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Figure 2: Cubic graph with six agents
0
1
4 5
2 3
Notes: Prism graph (a 3-regular graph) on six vertices.
Sources: Authors’ calculations.
6. Set Dij = Dji = 1 and update d+ to ⊖i,jd+.
7. Repeat steps 4 to 6 until the degree of agent i is zero.
8. Return to step 2.
The input for Algorithm 1 is the target degree sequence d+ and the output is an undirected
adjacency matrix D ∈ DN,d+ (i.e., with D
′ι = d+).5
Consider the 3-regular (i.e., cubic graph) depicted in Figure 2. Each agent in this graph has
exactly three links such that its degree sequence equals (3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3). In turns out that
there are two non-isomorphic cubic graphs on six vertices: the prism graph, shown in the
figure, and the utility graph (or complete bipartite graph on two sets of three vertices). We
can use Algorithm 1 to generate a random draw from the set of all graphs with a degree
sequence of d+ = (3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3).
As an example of a series of residual degree sequences (updated in Step 6 of the algorithm)
associated with a random draw from DN,d+ , for N = 6 and d+ = (3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3), consider:
(3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3)→ (2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3)→ (1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3)→ (0, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3)
→ (0, 1, 2, 3, 2, 2)→ (0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2)→ (0, 0, 1, 2, 1, 2)
→ (0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1)→ (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1)→ (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) .
Labelling agents i = 0, 1, . . . , 5 from left-to-right we can see that the first link is added
between agents 0 and 1 (the “active” node’s residual degree is bold-faced above). This is
illustrated in Figure 3, which begins with the labelled empty graph in the upper-left-hand
5Here ι denotes a conformable column vector of ones.
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corner and then sequentially adds links as we move from left-to-right and top-to-bottom.
Next a link is added between agents 0 and 4, and then between agents 0 and 2. Observe that
the algorithm selected agent 0 as the lowest degree agent in the initial step and continues to
connect this vertex with higher degree ones until all needed edges incident to it are present.6
In the 8th iteration of the algorithm an edge is added between agents 3 and 4. If, instead, an
edge was added between agents 4 and 5 at this point, the residual sequence degree sequence
would have been updated to (0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0), which is not graphic. Step 4 of the algorithm
prevents the addition of edges which, if added, lead to non-graphic degree sequences. It is in
this way that the algorithm avoids getting “stuck”. Getting stuck was a problem with earlier
approaches to binary matrix simulation, such as the method of Snijders (1991).
Importance sampling
Algorithm 1 produces a random draw from DN,d+ , however, it does not draw from this set
uniformly. A key insight of Blitzstein & Diaconis (2011) is that one can construct importance
sampling weights to correct for non-uniformity of the draws from DN,d+ .
Let YN,d+ denote the set of all possible sequences of links outputted by Algorithm 1 given
input d+. Let D (Y ) be the adjacency matrix induced by link sequence Y . Let Y and Y ′ be
two different sequences produced by the algorithm. These sequences are equivalent if their
“end point” adjacency matrices coincide (i.e., if D (Y ) = D (Y ′)). We can partition YN,d+
into a set of equivalence classes, the number of such classes coincides with the number of
feasible networks with degree distribution d+ (i.e., with the cardinality of DN,d+).
6In the event of ties for the lowest degree agent, the algorithm chooses the one with the lowest index.
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Figure 3: Simulation example
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Notes: Illustration of the construction of a random draw from DN,d+, for N = 6 and d+ = (3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3), as generated according to
Algorithm 1.
Sources: Authors’ calculations.
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Let c (Y ) denote the number of possible link sequences produced by Algorithm 1 that produce
Y ’s end point adjacency matrix (i.e., the number of different ways in which Algorithm 1 can
generate a given adjacency matrix). Let i1, i2, . . . , iM be the sequence of agents chosen in
step 3 of Algorithm 1 in which Y is the output. Let a1, . . . , am be the degree sequences of
i1, . . . , iM at the time when each agent was first selected in step 3, then
c (Y ) =
M∏
k=1
ak! (16)
To see why (16) holds consider two equivalent link sequences Y and Y ′. Because links
are added to vertices by minimal degree (see Step 3 of Algorithm 1), the agent sequences
i1, i2, . . . , iM coincide for Y and Y ′. This, in turn, means that the exact same links, perhaps
in a different order, are added at each “stage” of the algorithm (i.e., when the algorithm
iterates through steps 4 to 7 repeatedly for a given agent). The number of different ways to
add agent ik’s links during such a “stage” is simply ak! and hence (16) follows.
The second component needed to construct importance weights is σ (Y ), the probability that
Algorithm 1 produces link sequence Y . This probability is easy to compute. Each time the
algorithm chooses a link in step 5 we simply record the probability with which it was chosen
(i.e., the residual degree of the chosen agent divided by the sum of the residual degrees of
all agents in the choice set). The product of all these probabilities equals σ (Y ).
With c (Y ) and σ (Y ) defined we can now show how to estimate expectations with respect
to uniform draws from DN,d+ . Let T (D) be some statistic of the adjacency matrix. Here
for D is a draw from DN,d+ constructed using Algorithm 1. Consider the p-value estimation
problem discussed earlier:
E
[
pi (D (Y ))
c (Y ) σ (Y )
1 (T (D (Y )) > T (d))
]
=
∑
y∈YN,d
pi (D (y))
c (y)σ (y)
1 (T (D (y)) > T (d))σ (y)
=
∑
y∈YN,d
pi (D (y))
c (y)
1 (T (D (y)) > T (d))
=
∑
D∈DN,d+
∑
{y :D(y)=D}
pi (D)
c (y)
1 (T (D) > T (d))
=
∑
D∈DN,d+
pi (D) 1 (T (D) > T (d))
= Epi [1 (T (D) > T (d))] .
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Here pi (D) is the probability attached to the adjacency matrix D ∈ DN,d+ in the target
distribution over DN,d+ . The ratio pi (D (Y )) /c (Y ) σ (Y ) is called the likelihood ratio or the
importance weight. We would like pi (D) = 1/
∣∣DN,d+∣∣ for all D ∈ DN,d+.
Observe that Epi [T (D (Y ))] = E
[
pi(D(Y ))
c(Y )σ(Y )
T (D (Y ))
]
; setting pi (D (Y )) =
∣∣DN,d+∣∣−1 and
T (D (Y )) = 1 to the constant statistic, then suggests an estimate of
∣∣DN,d+∣∣ equal to
ˆ∣∣DN,d+∣∣ =
[
1
B
B∑
b=1
1
c (Yb)σ (Yb)
]
, (17)
and hence a p-value estimate of
ρˆT (G) =
[
1
B
B∑
b=1
1
c (Yb) σ (Yb)
]−1
×
[
1
B
B∑
b=1
1
c (Yb) σ (Yb)
1 (T (Db) > T (d))
]
. (18)
An attractive feature of (18) is that the importance weights need only be estimated up to a
constant. This feature is useful when dealing with numerical overflow issues that can arise
when
∣∣DN,d+∣∣ is too large to estimate.
Algorithm (1) is appropriate for simulating undirected networks. Recently Kim et al. (2012)
propose a method for simulating from directed networks with both fixed indegree and out-
degree sequences. Their methods is based on an extension of Havel-Hakimi type results to
digraphs due to Erdös et al. (2010). Pelican & Graham (2019) introduce an MCMC algo-
rithm for simulating digraphs satisfying various side constraints.
Illustration using the Nyakatoke network
The transitivity index for the Nyakatoke network, at 0.1884, is almost three times its as-
sociated network density of 0.0698. Is this excess transitivity simply a product of degree
heterogeneity alone? To assess this we used Algorithm 1 to take 5,000 draws from the set of
adjacency matrices with N = 119 and degree sequences coinciding with the one observed in
Nyakatoke (for reference the Nyakatoke degree distribution is plotted in Figure 4).
Figure 5 displays estimates of the distribution of two star and triangle counts, as well as the
transitivity index (and “optimal” transitivity statistic), with respect to the distribution of
uniform draws from DN,d+ (N = 119 and d+ coinciding with the one observed in Nyakatoke).
Measured transitivity is Nyakatoke is extreme relative to this reference distribution. This
suggests that clustering of links is, in fact, a special feature of the Nyakatoke network. It
is also interesting to note that the distribution of transitivity in this reference distribution
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Figure 4: Nyakatoke Degree Distribution
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Notes: This figure plots the probability (vertical axis) that a random household in Nyakatoke has
strictly more risk sharing links than listed on the horizontal axis.
Source: De Weerdt (2004) and authors’ calculations. Raw data available at
https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/joachim-deweerdt/ (Accessed January 2017).
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Figure 5: Reference distribution of transitivity index for Nyakatoke network
Notes: Histogram of two star counts, triangle counts and transitivity index values across 5,000
draws from DN,d+ (N = 119 and d+coinciding with the one observed in Nyakatoke). The final
figure plots the distribution of the “optimal” transitivity statistic given in Equation (13).
Sources: De Weerdt (2004) and authors’ calculations. Raw data available at
https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/joachim-deweerdt/ (Accessed January 2017).
is well to the right of 0.0698 (the density of all graphs in the reference distribution). The
skewed degree distribution in Nyakatoke forces a certain amount of transitivity, since high
degree nodes are more likely to link with one another. This highlights the value of a test
which proceeds conditionally on the degree sequence.
Figure 6 displays estimates of the distribution of network diameter and average distance.
Nyakatoke’s diameter is not atypical across networks with the same degree sequence. How-
ever, average distance is significantly longer in Nyakatoke. One interpretation of this fact is
that the Nyakatoke includes a distinct periphery of poorly connected/insured households.
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